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ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGAN EXCHANGE THROUGH THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN
SERVICES
INTRODUCTION

A

s the baby boomer generation ages and prominent figures
like Dick Cheney and Steve Jobs attract attention with
their high profile organ transplants, the question is now ripe in
the minds of many people around the world: what happens
when my body fails me?1 While modern medical technology and
advanced health care 2 now allow people to live longer—well
beyond what one could ever imagine in the past3—many people
will find that their own organs prove to be the limiting factors
in reaching a ripe, golden age. When contending with organ
failure, one must face either the difficult task of finding a
matching transplant donor or death. Increased trade in organ
transplant services can help address this critical shortage by
creating opportunities both for an organ exchange and for a
system that brings patients to transplant services located
abroad.

1. William Saleton, Help the Next Steve Jobs, SLATE (Oct. 4, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2011/10/stev
e_jobs_liver_transplant_organ_donation_is_the_best_way_to_ho.html (Steve
Jobs suffered liver cancer that required him to have a liver transplant. Because the transplant list was too long in his home community in Northern
California, he moved to Tennessee to receive the transplant. Jobs’s move solely for transplantation purposes made headlines because other needy people in
Northern California did not have the financial resources to move to an area
with a shorter waiting list.); Scott Shane, For Cheney, 71, New Heart Ends
TIMES
(Mar.
24,
2012),
20-Month
Wait,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/us/politics/dick-cheney-recovering-aftergetting-a-new-heart.html.
2. Max Kasriel, Organ Transplants, deny to those not registered as donors,
IDEA
(Sept.
5,
2009),
http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic_details.php?topicID=923.
3. END OF LIFE CARE: AN ETHICAL OVERVIEW, CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AT
UNIVERSITY
OF
MINNESOTA
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ahc.umn.edu/img/assets/26104/End_of_Life.pdf [hereinafter End
of Life Care].

830

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

While many countries attempt to increase organ donation
rates through domestic legislation,4 the practical effect of these
laws is to discourage international cooperation and restrict the
efficient movement of organs and people. This Note suggests a
regulated international organ exchange within the framework
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”),
whereby countries voluntarily commit to lower trade barriers
in all services related to the organ transplantation process. Increased trade and legitimate exchange in transplantation services within the GATS framework would result in a more efficient organ allocation system and increased donation rates.
Part I of this Note will provide background on the organ supply shortage, highlighting common problems arising in current
organ allocation policy, using the United States, the European
Union, Spain, Israel, and England as case studies. Part II of
this Note will develop an international exchange program, explaining why countries should and will participate in the exchange. Additionally, Part II will describe potential modes of
international cooperation and analyze whether these modes
can be applied effectively in the context of international organ
procurement and allocation. Part III of this Note will discuss
first why multilateral cooperation promulgated through the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) is the best
framework for encouraging trade, then how the exchange will
operate, and finally, how the exchange will interact with current domestic policy in other countries. Part III will also examine potential limitations to an international organ exchange
and the GATS framework.

4. Melisa Martínez et. al, The Potential for Bi-lateral Agreements in Medical Tourism: A Qualitative Study of Stakeholder Perspectives From the UK
and India, 7 GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH at 6 (May 3, 2011),
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/11;
Council
Directive
2010/45, 2010 O.J. (L 207/14) 1, 1 (EC)[hereinafter Directive]; J. Lavee et. al,
A new law for allocation of donor organs in Israel, LANCET 1131, 1131, March
27,
2010,
available
at
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(09)617955/fulltext.

2013]

INTERNATIONAL ORGAN EXCHANGE

831

I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ORGAN TRANSPLANT CRISIS
A. Global Organ Shortages
Countries worldwide have faced dire organ supply shortages
for decades, and the problem has become more severe due to
decreasing fatalities from traffic accidents in developed countries.5 Except for Iran, which allows organs to be sold, the waiting lists in every country are extremely long and the process is
very costly.6 These costs are not only exorbitant for patients,
but also for the governments that often pay for end-of-life
health care.7 In 2005, 14,000 people in the United States died
with transplantable organs that were not used for needy patients, and yet even if every one of these people had elected to
be donors, there would still be an overwhelming shortage. 8
With the United States health care system already hemorrhaging dollars, the government is seeking to cut costs, and the baby boomers—aging and thus increasing the demand for organ
transplants—will feel the effects of the government’s tight
budget constraint.9

5. Opting Out of Opting Out: Britain Rejects “Presumed Consent” for Organ
Donors—For
the
Time
Being,
ECON.
(Nov.
20,
2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12641944.
6. Organ Transplants: Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney: Governments Should
Let People Trade Kidneys, Not Convict Them For It, ECON. (Nov. 16, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/8173039.
7. Id.
8. Mark S. Nadel & Carolina A. Nadel, Using Reciprocity to Motivate Organ Donation, YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 293–295 (2005); Gil
Siegal and Richard J. Bonnie, Closing the Organ Gap: A Reciprocity-Based
Social Contract Approach, 34 DNA FINGERPRINTING & CIVIL LIBERTIES 415,
415 (2006); The gap between supply and demand: As demand for life-saving
transplant surgery grows, the idea of paying donors is gaining support, ECON.
(Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12380981 [hereinafter The gap
between supply and demand]; Only 43 percent of adults in the United States
are registered organ donors, leaving a waiting list of nearly 114,000 people in
2012. Michelle Healy, Now Facebook Wants You to Give Up Your Organs,
USA TODAY (May 2, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nowfacebook-wants-you-to-give-up-your-organs-2012-5.
9. Teck Chuan Voo et. al.; The Ethics of Organ Transplantation: Shortages and Strategies, 38 ACAD. MED. SINGAPORE 359, 359 (2009), available at
http://www.cwsl.edu/content/faculty/05%20voo%20et%20al%20%20the%20ethics%20of%20organ%20transplantation.pdf; An Overview of
Health Care: A Population Perspective, JB LEARNING 17, available at
http://www.jblearning.com/samples/0763749745/49745_Ch01.pdf.
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Most countries are unwilling to let needy patients buy organs, and disapprove of the use of methods by a minority of
countries that may be morally objectionable, such as harvesting organs from executed prisoners. 10 Some individuals and
even some national governments have tried radical or illegal
strategies to alleviate the shortages, including open organ sale,
organ trafficking, and transplant tourism. The World Health
Organization (“WHO”), however, maintains their official position is that the sale of organs in a commercial transaction, or
their exchange for valuable consideration, should be banned in
all countries.11 Similarly, in the United States, the “National
Organ Transplantation Act ([“NOTA”])…[also prohibits the exchange of]… ‘valuable consideration’ for organ donation.’“12
Although organ trafficking is illegal in most countries, 13 it
still is highly appealing to wealthy sick patients and to groups
who look to benefit from this desperation. Organ trafficking
through the black market is flourishing even in the early twenty-first century.14 In many cases this illegal organ trafficking
10. Jiefu Huang et. al, Government Policy and organ transplantation in
China,
LANCET
1937,
1937
(Dec.
2008),
http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(08)613598/fulltext. In “China, more than 90% of transplanted organs are obtained
form executed prisoners.” Id.
11. Directive, supra note 4, at 1.
12. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416.
13. Sheri R. Glaser, Formula to Stop the Illegal Organ Trade: Presumed
Consent Laws and Mandatory Reporting Requirements for Doctors, 12 HUM.
RTS.
BRIEF
20,
20
(2005),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/2glaser.pdf?rd=1 (“Organ trafficking
violates fundamental human rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, security
in person, and freedom from cruel or inhumane treatment. As such, several
international organizations have established standards on organ trafficking.
These include the World Health Organization’s Guiding Principles on Human
Organ Transplantation (1991); the World Medical Authority . . . ; the Council
of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (1997) and its
Optional Protocol Concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin (2002); and the Bellagio Task Force.”)
14. Jeneen Interlandi, Not Just Urban Legend, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 9, 2009,
7:00
PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/01/09/not-justurban-legend.html (“international organ trafficking—mostly of kidneys, but
also of half-livers, eyes, skin and blood—is flourishing . . . . The World Health
Organization estimates that one fifth of the 70,000 kidneys transplanted
worldwide every year come from the black market.” Organ trafficking even
involves U.S. hospitals and often “for about $150,000 per transplant . . . organ brokers [can] reach across continents to connect buyers and sellers,
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preys on the poor and exploits them, subjecting them to dangerous operations that carry the risk of spreading diseases and
killing both the donor and recipient.15
The common perception of organ trafficking is that it takes
place in a dark, dirty, “back room” in a developing country and
that it often involves organized crime. In reality, organ trafficking also occurs in many developed countries like the United
States and countries within the European Union.16 Such perceptions, and the horror stories precipitating them, negatively
impact the legitimate organ transplant processes, and thereby
discourage the principle of altruism that most systems around
the world depend upon for their organ supply.17
Another model individuals utilize to increase their chances of
obtaining a life-saving organ is by engaging in transplant tourwhom they then guided to “broker-friendly” hospitals here in the United
States.”). Dan Bilefsky, Black Market for Body Parts Spreads Among the Poor
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
28,
2012),
in
Europe,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/world/europe/black-market-for-bodyparts-spreads-in-europe.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1346432663VPWTbOQ+snTT/8JIM12XSg; Matthew Brunwasser, Trial Opens for 7 Kosovars in Organ-Trafficking Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/europe/trial-opens-for-7-kosovarsin-organ-trafficking-case.html?_r=1&emc=eta1.
15. Claire Suddath & Alex Altman, How Does Kidney-Trafficking Work?,
TIME
(July
27,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1912880,00.html; see also
Interlandi, supra note 14 (Lawrence Cohen, an anthropologist at UC Berkeley, discovered that there are pressures on many women in developing countries, such as India, to sell organs either voluntarily or out of fealty to their
husbands demands that they “contribute to the family’s income, or to provide
for the dowry of a daughter.”)
16. Suddath, supra note 15; see also Interlandi, supra note 14 (a needy
Israeli citizen was even able to find “an organ broker through a local paper in
Tel Aviv who arranged to have the transplant done at Mount Sinai Medical
Center in New York.”); Bilefsky, supra note 14. The gap between supply and
demand, supra note 8, at 4 (Many U.S. citizens were outraged when an “investigation by the Los Angeles Times [that] found that four notorious Japanese criminals received transplants at the Medical Center of the University
of California Los Angeles, apparently jumping a queue of needy Americans.”);
Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional
Picture Based on Integration of Available Information, 85 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
955,
956
(2007),
available
at
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370.pdf (“Finding a “transplant package” is easy with a simple online search, which reveals that “the
price of a renal transplant package [ranges] from US$70,000 to 160,000.”)
17. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8.
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ism.18 Transplant tourism is a concept similar to medical tourism where a citizen of one country travels to another country
for a variety of health services.19 The term “transplant tourism”
is often used with a negative connotation and the WHO even
adopted resolution WHA57.18, which “urges Member States to
‘take measures to protect the poorest and vulnerable groups
from ‘transplant tourism.’”20 Some scholars refer to transplant
tourism as “the purchase and sale . . . of organs . . . and other
elements relating to the commercialization of organ transplantation” including any “intermediaries and health-care providers
who arrange the travel and recruit donors.”21 Critics of medical
tourism find fault in this means of obtaining treatment because
it is often only available to the wealthy and in the case of
transplant tourism, specifically, may encourage the rise of a
black market for organs in countries with a weak regulatory
system or with a large poor population, such as India or China.22
Putting aside the negative connotations of the term “transplant tourism,” it is essential for this analysis to examine the
term in its most literal and legal sense: transplant tourism occurs when a person travels internationally to seek an organ
transplant or related services. Utilizing this neutral definition
of transplant tourism reveals the potential positive aspects of
transplant tourism within a well-structured and legitimate
regulatory framework.
B. Current Allocation Systems in the International Community
Throughout the world, the two most popular organ procurement systems are embodied in two systems, known as “opt-in”

18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id.; WHO Resolution WHA57.18, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 56, 57,
available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA57/A57_R18-en.pdf
(2004).
21. Yosuke, supra note 16.
22. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8 (In 2008, an investigation found that “109 [patients], mainly Israelis, each paid up to $120,000
for a ‘transplant holiday’); Yosuke, supra note 16.
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or “opt-out” systems.23 The United States’ organ procurement
system is an example of an opt-in system, in which individuals
must make an explicit decision to donate their organs, and relies on altruistic organ donors to support organ supply.24 In an
opt-out system—also referred to as presumed consent—“an individual is treated as having consented to donate organs absent
express instructions to the contrary.”25 The world’s most successful organ donation system, in Spain, is an opt-out system.26
The United States regulates organ donation through the
United Network for Organ Sharing (“UNOS”).27 “The allocation
of organs among those on the UNOS waiting list is based, to a
large degree, on compatibility. For most organs, [however],
consideration is first given to recipients located within the
same donation service area (“DSA”) as the donor.”28 The current system gives higher priority to patients in these DSA areas, despite the fact that with modern medical advancements,
other needier patients that are longer distances away may be
capable of receiving them.29 UNOS’s regulations also effectively
create a 5% maximum cap on transplants that can go to nonresident aliens through an audit mechanism.30 UNOS recogniz23. Eurotransplant: Legislation within the Eurotransplant Region,
EUROTRANSPLANT.ORG
(Apr
29,
2011),
1,
http://www.eurotransplant.org/cms/mediaobject.php?file=legislation.pdf.
24. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416.
25. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 307.
26. Id. at 302–303.
27. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 299.
28. Id. at 300 (“Nationwide, there are fifty eight DSAs, which are regional
combinations of organ procurement organizations (or OPOs) and their transplant center networks.”).
29. The Gift of a Lifetime, Understanding Donation: The Organ Transplant
ORGANTRANSPLANTS.ORG,
Waiting
List,
http://www.organtransplants.org/understanding/unos/ [hereinafter Gift of a
Lifetime]; D.L Segev et. al, Transporting Live Donor Kidneys for KidneyPaired Donation: Initial National Results, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANT 356, 360
(2011).
30. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND
TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK.
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_18.pdf
[hereinafter Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens] (last updated Sept. 1,
2012) (specific policies for non resident aliens); UNOS’s regulations in regard
to non-resident aliens state that “all member transplant centers agree to allow the Ad Hoc International Relations Committee to review and audit, at its
discretion, all center activities pertaining to transplantation of non-resident
aliens. The Committee will review the activities of each member transplant
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es that “international exchange of organs for transplantation is
technically feasible but remains an uncommon procedure.” 31
Under this policy, “[e]xportation of organs from the United
States or its territories is prohibited unless a well documented
and verifiable effort, coordinated through the Organ Center,
has failed to find a suitable recipient for that organ on the
[w]aiting [l]ist.” 32 Because thousands of Americans die every
year awaiting a transplant, 33 almost all organs will be transplanted domestically.
Opt-out or presumed consent organ procurement systems
have been very successful for countries that have implemented
them. 34 Spain celebrates the highest donation rates in the
world. 35 Many scholars suggest that Spain’s public relations
campaign and widespread knowledge and information about
organ donation is the reason for their successful organ allocation program.36 In the “Spanish Model . . . a specially trained
team, separate from the medical transplant teams, is responsible for increasing organ donations” by educating families about
the positive aspects of organ donation, and providing them with
all of the information they need to make an informed decision
based on correct information.37 The Spanish model also emphasizes comforting families and respecting the donor’s wishes and
creates legitimacy for the allocation system. 38 Because of its
positive results, other countries, including the United States,
have attempted to implement similar educational programs but
without major success.39

center where non-resident alien recipients constitute more than 5% of recipients of any particular type of deceased organ.” Id.
31. Id.
32. Policy Management – policies, 3.2.1.4, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK (last updated Sept. 1, 2012) Sept. 1, 2012,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp (Links to general policies) [hereinafter Policy Management- policies].
33. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8.
34. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5.
35. Id. (Spain is considered the “the world champion of cadaveric organ
donation, with 34.4 donors per million inhabitants compared with Britain’s
meager 10.6.”).
36. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 302–303.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. “A study in the United States showed that “about half of families
asked to donate refused. In addition to the reasons noted above, some fami-
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Facing familiar dire organ shortages, other countries have also attempted to reform their allocation systems in other innovative ways. In late summer 2012, the European Union adopted and implemented a directive relating to the harmonization
of health and safety standards across Member Nations in order
to facilitate donations and ensure the highest quality of organ
donation services.40 The EU legislators suggest that one way to
help the organ shortage within the EU is to promote standardized health and safety standards through a directive named the
European Union Organ Donation Directive (“EUODD”).41 The
EU believes that “the exchange of organs is an important way
of increasing the number of organs available and ensuring a
better match between donor and recipient and therefore improving the quality of transplantation . . . available organs
should be able to cross borders without unnecessary problems
and delays.”42 Another major aspect of the EUODD is making
organs traceable, especially when there is an organ exchange
with a developing country. 43 Although this requirement attempts to prevent the spread of diseases and adverse reactions,
this stringent requirement is harsher on developing countries
that will find this policy overly burdensome and prohibitive because their organ procurement and medical systems are not as
advanced as the EU’s.44
Israel also reformed its organ donation laws in an unprecedented and controversial way. 45 Israel, an opt-in country,
adopted a law that went into effect in January 2010 with a
“plan to increase the national number of individuals who have
lies are unwilling to delay funerals, and many act out of concern that the deceased ‘has already suffered enough.’” Id. at 299.
40. Directive, supra note 4, at 1; NHS Blood and Transplant, EU Directive
on the Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for
Transplantation, NHS BLOOD AND TRANSPLANT (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/downloads/board_papers/sept12/r12_91_EUODD_B
oard_Paper_September_12_3.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Directive, supra note 4, at 1.
44. Id. (The text of the EUODD with respect to third world and developing
countries reads as follows: “Organ exchange […] shall be allowed only where
the organs … can be traced from the donor to the recipient and vice versa; …
meet the quality and safety requirements equivalent to those laid down in
this Directive.”).
45. Lavee, supra note 4, at 1131.
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a donor card by giving priority in organ allocation to transplant
candidates who had signed a donor card before their listing
date.” 46 Organ allocation priority would also be “granted to
transplant candidates with a first-degree relative who was a
deceased organ donor and to any live donor of a kidney, liver
lobe, or lung lobe who subsequently needs an organ.” 47 This
new prioritization scheme is very controversial because it allows people to “skip the line,” and bases allocation decisions on
factors other than medical need.48 It may also generate problems with religious observers; religious Jews, for example, require that a body be treated in a particular way so as to not
blemish the body or disgrace the dead, and observe prompt burial practices.49 Although most rabbis support organ donation,
some people’s faith may not allow them to elect to be a donor.50
One commentary suggests that yet another “potential ethical
implication of the law is that it favours larger families with
more first-degree relatives who are, on paper, willing to be donors.”51
In recent years, Great Britain has changed their allocation
rules, as well.52 In July 2009, “the British government said . . .
that it plan[ned] to ban private organ transplants from dead
donors to allay fears that prospective recipients can buy their
way to the front of the line.”53 Although in practice this policy
would only affect the foreign patients coming to Great Britain
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gabrielle Loeb, Judaism’s perspectives on Organ Donation After Death,
PHILADELPHIA
JEWISH
VOICE
(Sept.
2008),
http://www.pjvoice.com/v38/38700judaism.aspx.
50. Id.
51. Victoria Y. Fan et. al, A New Law for Allocation of Donor Organs in
(July
24,
2010),
Israel,
LANCET
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)611385/fulltext (referring to Wright and Silva, scholars in the field who have written articles in The Lancet).
52. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5 (“Great Britain recently rejected a proposal to switch from an opt-in system to a presumed consent or optout policy, because of concerns about eliminating ‘the emotional benefit to
recipients and their families of knowing that the organ had been freely surrendered—as a gift.’”).
53. Private Organ Transplants Banned in the UK, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July
31, 2009, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32234139/ns/healthhealth_care/t/private-organ-transplants-banned-uk/#.UHcdY8VZXSg.
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to receive private transplants and publically funded transplants for domestic patients would still be permissible, this system would implement a protectionist policy, disadvantaging
any private transplant tourism and would effectively close the
borders to those non-citizens seeking to utilize Great Britain’s
sophisticated facilities or resources.54
II. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
EXCHANGE
Why should countries trade in or exchange organs and organ
transplantation services rather than keeping these valuable
resources domestically? Countries should exchange because of
the gains from international trade, which are typical for other
goods, 55 and because of the altruistic principles upon which
most allocation systems are built.56 There are numerous ways
that international actors can exchange, including unilateral
trade, reciprocity-based trade, bilateral trade, and multilateral
trade. It is important to utilize the right method of cooperation
in order to increase the welfare of needy and sick patients
worldwide. This section introduces the possible modes of international cooperation and introduces the idea that organ transplantation services should be multilaterally traded, specifically
using the GATS.
A. Why Countries Should Trade or Exchange Organ Transplantation Services
Basic economic theory suggests that there are important
gains from trade and exchange in commercial goods in open
markets. 57 There are also benefits from liberalizing trade in
other international markets, regardless of whether the goods
and services are being traded for valuable consideration in a
traditional open market.58 In the context of organ procurement
and allocation, systems that previously operated only in small
54. Id.
55. GATS: Fact and Fiction, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/gatsfacts1004_e.pdf (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012) [hereinafter GATS: Fact and Fiction].
56. Gift of a Lifetime, supra note 29.
57. The Case for Open Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012).
58. GATS: Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 3.
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local areas are becoming more geographically widespread59 and
an international exchange is possible. Before Congress promulgated national legislation regarding transplantation, organ
transplants were performed on a local basis, establishing local
primacy.60 As a consequence, along with medical criteria, geographic distances, the cost of transport, and the high risk that
an organ could perish during transport became prominent criteria in local priority schemes in the early years of NOTA.61 Because of medical advancements, faster transportation methods,
and preservation techniques, this system is now outdated, and
organs can reach people outside of the regional transplant center’s area.62 These outdated geographic center-based allocation
systems need to be expanded and incorporate international cooperation.63
1. Altruistic Justifications for Exchange
A move towards an international organ exchange is supported by the ethical underpinnings of the principle upon which
most countries in the world base their systems: altruism.64 Altruism in this context suggests that it is morally right to donate your organs at death because your generosity could save
you neighbor’s life.65 Some scholars argue that “organs donated
from deceased donors should be considered a national resource
and are not ‘owned’ by the local or retrieval team,” and that or-

59. Segev, supra note 29, at 360.
60. John P. Roberts, Prioritization and Distribution of Organs for Liver
SPAN,
Transplantation,
CENTER
http://www.centerspan.org/pubs/liver/roberts1.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2012).
61. Id.; John M. Coombes and James F. Trotter, Development of the Allocation System for Deceased Donor Liver Transplants, 3 CLINICAL MED. & RES.
87,
88–89
(2005),
available
at
http://www.clinmedres.org/content/3/2/87.full.pdf.
62. Id.
63. See also Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance on a Constraint on Markets, 21 J.
OF ECON. PERSP. 37, 38 (2007) (explaining that gains from exchange in kidneys can be realized and have been realized in kidney exchange programs in
New England).
64. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416.
65. Id. (noting that all allocation systems depend to some degree on the
generosity of society to donate).
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gans should be distributed nationally to needy patients.66 The
idea that organs do not belong to any one area or country
aligns with the general motivations of altruistic donation. Evidence suggests that when a person elects to be a donor, they do
not do so solely to benefit their small geographic area and that
they will not be deterred from donation if they knew their organ would be distributed to another area.67
Since organ transplantation can easily save a life, it is hard
to rationalize the United States’ outdated domestic geographic
system; the same reasoning applies to keeping organs as a national resource and not an international resource. John
Donne’s famous saying that “no man is an island now extends
with equal force to communities, regions, nations, continents—
and, for that matter, to islands.”68 When someone in Brazil or
Russia desperately needs an organ, why is that person more-orless deserving than an American or EU citizen? The current
geographic limitations on organ donation “lead to some arbitrary variation,” which do not align with the principle of altruism.69
2. Theoretical Justifications for Exchange
Framing global justice in terms of the philosopher John
Rawls’s difference principle, a society should redistribute
wealth to increase the welfare of “the status of the least well-off
members of society.”70 Restricting organs to one locale or one
country not only violates this principle, but it also unfairly favors people in a country with good transplantation, allocation,
and regulatory systems, even if those people would never altruistically donate themselves. Modern liberal philosopher Loren
Lomasky explains that in Rawls’s later works he recognized
that the difference principle itself might not apply globally.
Rawls believed that “many people believe that their obligations
66. James Neuberger & Gill Thomas, When the Law Meets Organ Transplantation: The Experience from the United Kingdom, 92 TRANSPLANT J. 262
(Aug. 15, 2011).
67. Institute of Medicine (U.S.) Committee on Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Policy, Organ procurement and transplantation, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 52 (1999) [hereinafter Institute of Medicine].
68. Loren E. Lomasky, Liberalism Beyond Borders, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY &
POLICY FOUND. 206, 207 (2007).
69. Neuberger & Thomas , supra note 66, at 262.
70. Lomasky, supra note 68, at 208.
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to co-nationals are weightier and more extensive than those
owed to extra-nationals.”71 Similarly, current domestic-oriented
organ allocations systems place a higher weight on the lives of
citizens in that particular country. Nonetheless, Lomasky believes that there are still important moral obligations to those
outside one’s close community.72 In particular, Lomaksy argues
that it is important to not cause inadvertent harm through policies that restrict the movement of goods or people.73 Since organ failure has no direct connections with a person’s place in
society, either financially or geographically, restricting organs
to one DSA causes harm to those outside the area by restricting
the efficient movement of organs. These geographic restrictions
are not only hurting needy patients, they are “an unjustifiable
restraint on liberty . . . [just like many] cross-border employment and residence agreements.”74 International cooperation in
the context of organ transplantation may achieve better results
for the welfare of people around the world.
Governments and countries also have practical considerations that should motivate them to adopt a system of international cooperation, including increasing efficiency, reducing
health care and transaction costs, responding to strong political
pressures, and increasing overall donation rates. These practical motivations, discussed in Part IV, may combat the traditional skepticism of sharing organs within countries and across
borders that plague many current allocation systems.
B. Methods of International Cooperation
Countries must interact efficiently with each other in their
international dealings, and this can be achieved through various strategies of international cooperation. 75 Countries may
decide to take unilateral action with respect to other countries,
utilize reciprocity agreements to trade or exchange commodities between countries, or cooperate through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Each of these alternative modes of coopera-

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 226.
William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: THE EXTENTS AND LIMITS OF MULTILATERALISM, 4 (William
Zartman & Saadia Touval eds., 2010) [hereinafter Zartman].
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tion in the context of organ transplantation has important implications on domestic and foreign needy patients.
1. Unilateral Action
Countries often unilaterally dictate their own policies for the
treatment of other countries or foreign citizens.76 A country bases its domestic laws on its own laws, values, and its citizens’
preferences. 77 In an immigration law context, for example, a
country unilaterally chooses its policies regarding the movement of foreigners in and out of the its territory, despite the
fact that these laws may affect other countries.78
Similarly, in the context of organ transplantation, countries
like the United States and the United Kingdom unilaterally
implement laws based on their own policy concerns.79 This restricts foreigners’ access to organs and organ transplantation
services.80 Currently the most common method that countries
utilize in the context of organ transplantation is the unilateral
method with little to no coordination with other countries.81
2. Reciprocity
Countries may also choose to adopt a system of reciprocity,
where countries trade goods or favors and keep track of the
levels of exchange, in effect creating a commodity-type trading
regime. This also could be characterized as “tit-for-tat” trading.82
Visa reciprocity provides an example of this kind of relationship. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are all countries that practice visa reciprocity, which requires foreigners to obtain expen-

76. Shashi Tharoor, Why America Still Needs The United Nations,
AFF.
(Sep./Oct.
2003),
FOREIGN
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59184/shashi-tharoor/why-americastill-needs-the-united-nations.
77. Id.
78. Gordon H. Hanson, The Governance of Migration Policy, 2009 UCSD
AND NBER 1, at 1 available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/037/11123.pdf.
79. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, supra note 30; Martínez et al.,
supra note 4, at 6.
80. Transplantation of Non-Resident Aliens, supra note 30; Martínez et al.,
supra note 4, at 6.
81. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5; Policy Management – policies,
supra note 32, at 3.2.1.4.
82. Zartman, supra note 75, at 6.
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sive visas—sometimes up to $150—if their home country requires a visa for citizens of the destination country when they
enter the traveler’s home country.83 For example, the United
States does not require a British traveler to obtain a visa to visit the United States, but does require Brazilians to obtain a visa.84 In response, Americans traveling to Brazil are required to
obtain a visa prior to traveling in Brazil. 85 This method is
based on tit-for-tat exchange where countries keep track of the
treatment by others and treat them accordingly in the future.86
Scholars often approach agreements in health services, and
specifically organ transplantation, through the lens of reciprocity or tit-for-tat organ trading between centers.87 In organ allocation reciprocity “those who committed to donate organs
would be granted a preference in the event that they later required a transplant.”88 Some scholars suggest that a reciprocity
or “payback scheme” may be the solution to the organ shortage
“whereby a center (or sometimes a country) which provides an
organ to another center or country for a ‘high priority’ recipient
will be paid back when another organ becomes available.”89 A
group of scholars suggests one version of a reciprocity arrangement that is based on a social contract in the form of insurance: a person would receive a bonus for electing to be a donor and in exchange they would have a better chance of receiving an organ if they needed it in the future.90 Because these
reciprocity and insurance ideas use the fear of needing a transplant in the future in order to motivate people to donate, they
are subject to criticism that they do not align with the tradi83. Eileen Smith, Argentina Joins the Reciprocity Club: U.S. Visitors Pay
$131
on
Entry,
MATADORNETWORK.COM
(Dec.
14,
2009),
http://matadornetwork.com/trips/argentina-joins-the-reciprocity-club-u-svisitors-to-pay-131-on-entry/.
84. Tim Rogers, Let Them In: How Brazilians Could Help the U.S. Econo(June
3,
2011),
my,
TIME
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075717,00.html;
Visa
&
ESTA Information, VISIT USA (2011), http://www.visitusa.org.uk/Visa-andESTA-Information/125.
85. Id.
86. Zartman, supra note 75, at 6.
87. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 294.
88. Id.
89. Neuberger & Thomas, supra note 66, at 263.
90. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 314 (This “bonus would be phased in,
based on how long a patient had been registered as willing to donate.”)
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tional principle of altruism.91 Countries do not allow organs to
be exchanged for “valuable consideration” because they believe
that altruism and generosity should be the driving force for donation.92 Reciprocity does not promote the moral underpinnings
of altruism, and thus is not a realistic policy change.93 Reciprocity is not consistent with the spirit of an international exchange because it emphasizes the idea that an organ belongs to
one country, while in reality, no country “owns” an organ.94
3. Bilateral Cooperation
Another theory of international cooperation is based on bilateral agreements regarding the treatment of the citizens of both
countries. Bilateral cooperation may occur in the context of any
specialized trade agreement between two countries,95 or other
direct interactions, such as those pertaining to countries’ establishment of their surrounding borders.96 By their very nature,
border disputes require countries to work bilaterally to generate common laws and policy that complement each other.97 For
example, the United States and Mexico have bilaterally negotiated to put into place particular regulations and procedures
concerning the maintenance and integrity of their common
border.98
In the context of organ transplantation, another potential
mechanism for cooperation is a bilateral agreement to trade
services. A group of scholars conducted a survey of subjects in
India and England to measure their attitudes toward a possible
bilateral trade agreement concerning organ transplantation.99
The study found that while trade may be mutually beneficial
for both countries, the public was skeptical of such an agree91. Id.
92. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8, at 416.
93. Gift of a Lifetime, supra note 29.
94. Neuberger & Thomas, supra note 66, at 262.
95. Forms of International Cooperation, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION,
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/migration-managementfoundations/international-cooperation/forms-internationalcooperation/cache/offonce;jsessionid=0772943C72A9DAE54A6F84D915923AFF.work
er01 (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Martínez et al., supra note 4, at 1.

846

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:2

ment.100 The public perception of the bilateral agreement was
prohibitory because there was no regulatory framework or public relations campaign to reveal how the agreement actually
operated or could be beneficial.101 Any bilateral cooperation in
organ transplant services will suffer from the same pitfalls because, with just two countries participating in exchange, the
public will question if there will be any real gains from trade
and question the quality of the other country’s health care.102
This is due to the fact that bilateral exchange can exacerbate
inequities in bargaining power between countries, especially
when there is a lack of a legitimate, regulated system.103 “Bilateral deals with other countries [often create] unbalanced . . .
one-on-one negotiations, [which] opens the way for all manner
of lobbies to ram their self-serving demands into the agreements.”104 A system that could offer more transparency, legitimacy, and a more sophisticated regulatory framework—like
multilateral exchange—would be more beneficial in the organ
transplantation context.
4. Multilateral Cooperation
The final example of international cooperation is multilateral
cooperation, where countries come together and make agree100. Id.
101. Id. The study established that the best framework in this context
would be a bilateral relationship, with contract-based terms, which could be
individually customized. Id. at 2–3. It conducted “a total of 30 semistructured interviews . . ., 20 in India and 10 in the UK.” Id. at 3. The interviews revealed that Indians generally thought their medical services were
undervalued. Id. at 5. From the other prospective, the British questioned the
quality and safety of procedures in India and did not think they could benefit
from a bilateral arrangement with India, despite the reality that Indian medicine is very sophisticated. Id. at 5. In fact, 70–80% of Indian doctors are
trained in the United Kingdom and safety standards are comparable to those
in the United States and Britain. Id. at 5.
102. Id. at 1
103. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Wrong Way to Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES (July 24,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/opinion/25bhagwati.html. As noted economist and professor at Columbia University, Jagdish Bhagwati, argued in the New York Times, “bilateral trade agreements are not the same as
free trade. Yes, they liberalize trade for the parties involved, but outsiders
then face a handicap. The discrimination comes in the form of barriers like
tariffs and antidumping charges, which countries impose on imports that
they believe are priced artificially low.” Id.
104. Id.
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ments with each other in order to lower transaction costs and
decrease trade barriers.105 Multilateral agreements may come
in various forms, but often contain non-discrimination agreements between countries, or in some cases most-favored and
national treatment clauses, where countries agree to treat all
parties to the agreement as favorably as all other countries.106
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), signed
originally in 1947, is a well-known example of a multilateral
cooperation in which over 100 countries eventually came together diplomatically in “Rounds” (or diplomatic summits) and
established standards for the international trade in goods.107
The GATT treaty was designed to coordinate tariff concessions
and included national treatment, most favored nation (“MFN”),
and non-discrimination clauses in order to ensure the integrity
of the system and to presumably level the playing field for the
member countries.108
Although countries have not attempted any multilateral cooperation in the context of organ transplantation and allocation, there is potential for cooperation. While some groups of
countries, like the EU, have begun to coordinate their organ
allocation systems through harmonization of health and safety
standards,109 countries need more multilateral negotiations to
achieve the optimal level of international organ exchange and
105. Zartman, supra note 75, at 67.
106. Douglas A. Irwin, Multilateral and Bilateral policies In the World
Trading System: A Historical Perspective in New Dimensions in Regional Integration, CENTRE FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. 91 (Ed. Jaime De Melo, Arvind Panagariya1993); Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2012). Under the concept of most-favored nation, “countries cannot
normally discriminate between their trading partners . . . [if a country
grants] someone a special favour (such as a lower customs duty rate for one of
their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members.” Id.
Under the national treatment principle, “imported and locally-produced goods
should be treated equally—at least after the foreign goods have entered the
market.” Id.
107. The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited
October 3, 2012).
108. Id. (noting that the GATT was eventually replaced in 1994 with the
WTO, another multilateral effort to govern international trade relations).
109. Directive, supra note 4, at 3.
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to establish a transparent and legitimate system. Instances of
individuals attempting to begin a grassroots international organ exchange occurred recently where an American woman donated a kidney to a Greek man and because of this generosity
the Greek man’s wife donated her kidney to a patient in Pennsylvania. 110 Countries now have the opportunity to facilitate
this type of exchange between international patients with multilateral cooperation and to assist individuals who would like to
spread their generosity internationally. For these reasons, and
others discussed below, multilateral efforts to create an international organ exchange, specifically through the GATS, is the
preferable mode of cooperation, and could potentially inspire
the international community to be more inclined to donate,
thereby alleviating the international organ shortage.
III. THE GATS’S APPLICATION TO AN INTERNATIONAL ORGAN
EXCHANGE
This Part will more fully introduce the GATS, describe its relation to health services, and explain why the regulation of organ transplantation is best achieved through the GATS framework. It will also explicate how the regulation would practically
operate, and outline other necessary and complimentary characteristics that should accompany regulation through the
GATS. It will then discuss this proposal’s interaction with current domestic laws in countries around the world, possible limitations to an exchange, and regulation of that exchange
through the GATS.
A. Introduction to the GATS
The GATS was created in 1995 through the adoption of
measures under the Uruguay Rounds, which also created the
WTO.111 In contrast to the well-known GATT, which focuses on
trade in goods, the GATS focuses on “measures affecting international trade in services—including health services such as
health insurance, hospital services, telemedicine, and acquisi-

110. Lindy Royce-Bartlett, infra note 185.
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
111. Services
Trade,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm (last visited October 3,
2012) [hereinafter Services Trade].
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tion of medical treatment abroad.”112 The purpose of the GATS
is to create an international business climate where trade barriers are low in order “to promote efficiency and economic
growth.”113 Currently, not all countries have made concessions
under the treaty in order to increase the flow of services.114 The
GATS agreement is overseen by the WTO and “requires countries to provide national treatment to foreign-service providers
in those service industries which they have agreed to liberalize
under GATS.”115
The GATS contains a “framework text[,] which sets out the
general concepts, principles, and rules that apply to measures
affecting the trade in services,” but also “annexes [ ] to the
agreement, which establish principles and rules for specific sectors and complement the framework text [and] specific commitments liberalizing trade within the service sectors and subsectors listed in the national schedule of member countries.”116
Unlike the GATT, countries can limit their commitments to
particular service sectors; “some countries have limited their
commitments to just a few of the 160 possible service sectors,
while others have opened their markets (at varying degrees of
openness) to more than 140 sectors.” 117 Therefore, the GATS
represents a “list of the specific commitments to market liberalization made by each member country,” which some countries
have used to open their markets, while others are less willing
to decrease trade barriers.118
There are two types of rules or commitments that can potentially bind a country that is a GATS signatory: conditional and

112. Leah Belsky et. al, The General Agreement On Trade In Services: Implications For Health Policymakers, 23 HEALTH AFF. 137, 137 (2004).
113. Id. at 138.
114. Ian S. Mutchnick et. al, Trading Health Services Across Borders:
HEALTH
AFF.
43-44
(2005),
GATS,
Markets
and
Caveats,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/01/25/hlthaff.w5.42.full.pdf
+html.
115. Anthony Amunategui Abad, Annex 25. General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS): Health Services, TA ADVISORY SERVICES 1 (Feb. 20, 2010).
116. Id.; see generally Case Summary: WTO Internet Gambling Case,
CITIZEN.ORG
(March
2007),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Gamblingsummary2007.pdf
[hereinafter
WTO Internet Gambling Case].
117. Mutchnick et al., supra note 114, at 42–43.
118. Id.
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unconditional commitments.119 Unconditional commitments are
general commitments by which all countries must abide and to
which they are all bound.120 MFN treatment is an example of
an unconditional commitment, under which a country must not
discriminate between trading partners; if a country wants to
afford better treatment to one country, they must afford that
more favorable treatment to everyone. 121 Countries also may
not put limitations on national treatment, meaning that countries must afford “like” foreign services no less favorable treatment than domestic services.122 The other type of commitment
that may bind a country is a conditional commitment, where a
country may voluntarily lower barriers to trade on a given
schedule with regard to a specific service in a specific industry.123
The GATS contains different “Modes” of the service transactions including:
Mode 1: Cross-border movement of service products . . . Mode
2: consumption abroad or movement of consumers to the
country of importation . . . Mode 3: commercial presence of the
establishment of a commercial presence in the country where
the service is to be provided . . .[and] Mode 4: movement of
natural persons or temporary movement of natural persons to
another country, in order to provide the service there.124

The conditional obligations only apply if a country identifies a
particular service sector with respect to opening trade.125
The GATS also contains exceptions similar to the GATT.126
GATS section XIV, for example, creates an exception for a
country that wants to protect “human, animal or plant life or
health.”127 Another important exception is contained in GATS
Article I(3) which “excludes services supplied in the ‘exercise of
governmental authority,’” defined as services supplied neither
119. Abad, supra note 115, at 2.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Belsky et al., supra note 112, at 139.
126. Id. at 140.
127. General Agreement on Trade in Services 294–95, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26gats_01_e.htm(follow “pdf format” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
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“on a commercial basis” nor “in competition with one or more
services suppliers.”128
B. The GATS’s Relation to Health Services
One way countries use the GATS is to lower barriers in
health-related services by “opening national markets to foreign
health services . . . [through a series] of trade agreements that
prohibit discriminatory treatment of foreign suppliers” as well
as encouraging the consumption of medical services abroad
(Mode 1).129 Because the health sector is a lucrative market and
has an enormous potential for growth, countries may want to
voluntarily liberalize their policies relating to the exchange of
health care services. 130 “Of greater significance, however,
[scholars argue that] these markets are opening and will do so
with or without the knowledge, experience, and perspective of
the academic and commercial health care community of the developed world.”131 As countries close their borders and create
restrictive policies, needy patients often have no choice but to
turn to a preexisting black market for organs, which is often
dangerous and can exploit many people in the process.132 There
is a strong incentive to liberalize trade in health-related or
transplantation-related services in order to crowd-out the black
market and establish a legitimate and regulated market.
GATS’s category consumption of medical services abroad
(Mode 1) is particularly applicable to organ transplantation because of the profits and revenue involved.133 “Trade in mode 2
is an important source of revenue for countries such as Cuba . .
. and China . . . [and] the Mayo Clinic provides highly specialized services for wealthy foreigners, while specialty hospitals in
India attract U.S. patients by providing international-quality
liver transplants for one-tenth the U.S. cost.”134

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Belsky et al., supra note 112, at 140.
Mutchnick et al., supra note 114, at 42.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Interlandi, supra note 14; see also Brunwasser, supra note 14.
Id.
Id.
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C. Regulation Through the GATS is the Preferable Option
Upon examination, the services involved in organ transplantation do fit into the context of the GATS. Organ procurement
and allocation systems around the world are largely established upon geographic boundaries, giving preference to people
in a certain geographic location before looking outside of these
areas for other matches. 135 Just like the gains from international free trade that each country can experience, countries
and sick patients can benefit from an international organ exchange system that is not based on geographic protectionism.136
For example, “[t]he cross boarder exchange of donor organs allows rare matches and help to specific transplant candidates.”137
In order to be governed by the GATS, organ transplantation
needs to be considered a service. Medical services such as complex surgeries, cosmetic surgery, and other types of advanced
medical treatment are considered services because they involve
a team of medical staff performing services on a patient.138 A
procured organ, for example, would be useless without the operation that transplants it into a new patient; the skill, safety,
and technique of the operation is just as important as the actual organ itself. Also, the surgery involved in procurement—a
service—is very important in order to effectively extract, preserve, transport, and transplant the organ from the donor to its
future recipient.139 Although organ transplantation may not at
135. Gift of a Lifetime, supra note 29 (“80 percent of all organs donated and
used in the same geographic area.”); also see Directive, supra note 4, at 1;
Martínez et al., supra note 4, at 6.
136. Press Release, EU Commissioner Dali meets Eurotransplant,
EUROTRANSPLANT
2
(July
25,
2011),
http://www.eurotransplant.org/cms/index.php?page=newsitems&oid=458&act
ion=viewitem&id=1615 [hereinafter EU Commissioner Dali].
137. Id.
138. Tom Harris, How Organ Transplants Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/life/human-biology/organtransplant2.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
139. Id. The characterization of an organ transplantation as a multijurisdictional service in the context of the GATS becomes more transparent
by examining the steps involved in an organ transplant starting with the
donor and ending with the donee receiving a transplant. The first service involved is the procurement process. Organ procurement occurs when the
healthy organ is removed from a deceased or living donor. Id. Removing an
organ from a donor requires a complex surgery in order to ensure it is har-
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first glance meet the definition of a service as clearly as does
general surgery, it is certainly a hybrid of services and can be
treated as a service under the Modes relating to health services
under the GATS.
Once organ transplantation services can be thought of as a
multiple jurisdictional service, the rules and jurisprudence
commonly connected to the GATS will apply. One notable WTO
case analyzed the GATS as it pertained to gambling companies.140 In this case, “the Caribbean Island nation of Antigua
challenged three U.S. anti-racketeering statutes and four state
laws as ‘barriers to trade’ in ‘cross-border gambling services’
under . . . [the] GATS.”141 Antigua argued that the American
laws “prevented the supply of gambling and betting services
from Antigua-domiciled Internet gambling providers to U.S.
customers on a cross-border basis.”142 The “U.S. lost [the case]
because it violated the ‘market access’ obligation” and they
were unable to exercise the exception laid out for “public morals” because that exception is limited.143 This case was a classic
example of how the GATS prohibits countries closing their borders to foreign service-providers.

vested in a way that can be successfully transplanted in the future. Id. The
next service involved is the transportation of the organ. Id. Organs can be
very unstable and fragile, and need to be transported in a very specific way in
a preservative chemical and under ice. Doctors must then follow a particular
protocol and transport the organ from the hospital where procurement occurred to a regional transplantation center usually on a helicopter or plane.
Id. The final service involved not only involves a complex surgery by specially
trained doctors, but also requires doctors and hospital staff to administer
antibiotics and other anti-rejection drugs. Id. “While other surgery patients
typically can move on from the experience, most transplant recipients must
continue medical treatment for the rest of their lives” because of a weakened
immune system. Id.
140. Panel Report, United States –Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007);
WTO Internet Gambling Case, supra note 116 (The name of the WTO case
involving foreign gambling companies is named “United States—Measures
Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services.”).
141. WTO Internet Gambling Case, supra note 116 at 1.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2.
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The major goals of the GATS are to lower trade barriers to
both providing and consuming services abroad.144 Trade barriers can develop when a country provides services to a foreign
national or when a citizen of one country goes abroad to consume services.145 These two types of trade barriers can be illustrated through a hypothetical relationship between France and
the United States. Suppose that an American doctor procures
an organ, and an American transportation service or a nonprofit organization attempts to transport the organ to France.
The French government may have passed a law stating that
French transplant centers can only transplant organs that are
procured in French regional hospitals. A French doctor would
be prohibited from transplanting the organ procured using
American services to anyone in France. In such an instance, a
government would be preventing a foreign-service provider
from providing a service domestically. Just as in the GATS
gambling case, this would represent a violation under the
GATS.
The other major example of a classic GATS principle applied
to this context is when a country prohibits a citizen from consuming a service abroad.146 This would occur if a U.S. law prohibited a qualified needy American from traveling to France to
obtain the services involved in an organ transplant. Under
Mode 2 of the GATS, consumption of medical services abroad is
considered a service and a country should not implement laws
to prevent people from traveling and receiving medical services
in another country, because this is a restraint on the free exchange of services internationally.147
A common perception of the GATS is that it regulates services where there is a competitive open market and involves
monetary consideration or exchanges.148 While this is true in
most cases, traditional market exchanges are not the only reason to encourage trade liberalization in the exchange of services. Countries may still want to create a market regulated
through the GATS absent a traditional open market. In their
144. Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 33–34,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (last
visited October 4, 2012).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 34.
147. Mutchnick et al., supra note 114, at 4.
148. GATS: Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 3.
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article “GATS: Fact and Fiction,” the WTO emphasizes the
benefits that trade liberalization in services would provide to
consumers, especially, “[i]n markets where supply is inadequate, [for example] imports of essential services can be as vital as imports of basic commodities.”149 Organ shortages are a
problem in almost every country around the world and “[t]he
benefits of services liberalization extend far beyond the service
industries themselves; they are felt through their effects on all
other economic activities,” similar to potential savings in the
health care sector.150 Countries may benefit from the liberalization of trade in services for other reasons, including foreign direct investment in a developing country.
The altruistic theory that underlies most transplantation systems provides another reason why countries would benefit from
trade liberalization in services absent an established open
market. If governments believe in the value of altruistic donation and want organs to be exchanged or to be available for
needy people around the world, then they may want to prevent
barriers to the trade in services or organs even though no money is changing hands. It is a well-established principle, reinforced by the WHO, that organs are not to be exchanged for
valuable consideration, but countries still may want to use the
mechanism of the GATS to reap the benefits of exchange, absent a traditional for-profit organ market.
The opportunity to utilize the preexisting black market for
organs constitutes yet another significant reason that countries
may want to use GATS to regulate the exchange of transplantation services. Countries will want to create a legitimate organ
exchange in order to crowd out the exploitive black market.
Crowding out the black market may be a very effective tactic
for countries, especially in light of the recent boom of social
media. Organ traffickers could use social media to find poor
donors with wealthy sick patients and use these sites to sell
organs or exchange organs for valuable consideration. Because
of people’s ability to use social media to reach beyond their social circles and communicate with people around the world, it is
unrealistic to think that one country’s laws can stop people
from using social media sites like Facebook or Twitter to find

149. Id.
150. Id.
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organs.151 Social media has the potential to worsen the problem
of organ trafficking because it easily could connect buyers and
sellers,152 and therefore countries may want to embrace the fact
that people want to look outside their borders for life-saving
resources and regulate the process so it is more controlled and
safe.
If human organ transplants are considered to be a service
under the GATS, then what is now labeled as “transplant tourism” can be a legal, regulated, and positive advancement in the
global organ shortage dilemma.
D. How Regulation of Organ Transplantation Will Practically
Operate
Under the optimal framework proposed, countries would voluntarily commit themselves to a schedule of commitments
made up of market access, national treatment, and MFN
treatment in health services relating to organ transplantation,
which would create an international organ exchange based on
medical need, efficiency, and practical considerations. Countries would follow a GATS framework, which allows countries
to open their markets on their own schedule, and tailor their
commitments to a narrow sector relating to certain services.153
151. See, e.g., New Kidney on the Block: Woman Finds Organ Donor via 80’s
Singer
Donnie
Wahlberg
and
Twitter,
DAILY
MAIL,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1380817/New-Kidney-block-Womanfinds-organ-donor-80s-singer-Donnie-WahlbergTwitter.html#ixzz1ZwCYRrqN (last updated Apr. 26, 2011, 2:21 PM). The
power of social media is exemplified through the story of Bobbette Miller,
who desperately needed a kidney transplant but “faced a grueling five year
wait for a new organ.” Id. Her friend started a “Twitter campaign” to find her
an organ donor and Donnie Wahlberg, New Kids On The Block band member
and teen idol, offered to help. Id. He tweeted to his over 180,000 Twitter followers and among the numerous responses he found a perfect match. Id. Social media can now be used as a tool to match patients with donors, but social
media may also be used as a dangerous interface for trafficking. Id.; Healy,
supra note 8.
152. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 8; Matt Richtel and Kevin Sack, Facebook
Is Urging Members to Add Organ Donor Status, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/technology/facebook-urges-members-toadd-organ-donor-status.html?_r=1 (“[E]xperts say Facebook could create an
informal alternative to such registries that could, even though it carries less
legal weight, lead to more organ donations.”).
153. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and
the List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
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Under a GATS schedule of commitments each country lists
“which services sectors and under what conditions the basic
principles of the GATS[—]market access, national treatment
and MFN treatment—apply within that country’s jurisdiction.” 154 These commitments are also listed “with respect to
each of the four modes of supply”: “cross-border supply; consumption abroad; commercial presence; and presence of natural persons.”155 With respect to organ transplantation services,
a country could choose to voluntarily commit to open their
markets in organ and health related services in the crossborder supply sector, where “non-resident service suppliers . . .
supply services cross-border into the Member’s territory” or the
consumption abroad sector, where there is “freedom for the
Member’s residents to [consume] services in the territory of another Member.”156 When countries agree to bind themselves to
commitments in a given sector “a government therefore binds
the specified level of market access and national treatment and
undertakes not to impose any new measures that would restrict entry into the market or the operation of the service.”157
Countries will be allowed to list exemptions and limitations on
their commitments in their schedules with a description of
what the exemption is and to whom it applies. 158 They also
must list how long it will last and “the conditions creating the
need for the exemption.” 159 In relation to organ transplantation
services, countries may want to develop their own systems, or
slowly phase-in to this drastic change in the market. The GATS
allows countries to clearly state in writing any limitations to
market access and list any conditions upon which their total
market access may be conditioned, such as a certain level of

http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 6,
2012).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. (“Specific commitments thus have an effect similar to a tariff binding—they are a guarantee to economic operators in other countries that the
conditions of entry and operation in the market will not be changed to their
disadvantage.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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health and safety standards, or internationally recognized organ need criteria.160
E. Other Necessary Complimentary Aspects of the Proposal
In conjunction with multilateral commitments through the
GATS, participating states need to establish a set of minimum
health and safety standards in order to monitor and encourage
the trade of organ and transplantation services between countries. Regulations relating to health and safety standards are
essential to maintaining the quality and integrity of existing
organ transplantation systems that exist within countries, improving developing transplantation centers, and ensuring that
organs are being safely procured, transported, delivered, and
transplanted. Requiring these minimum standards, however, is
not only about ensuring safety during the transplantation process, but also inspiring confidence in the public, increasing the
legitimacy of the organ exchange system and increasing donation rates. One of the fundamental reasons that Spain is considered the “world champion of cadaveric organ donation” is
because of its successful public relations campaign, which increases the awareness and integrity of the system to the general public.161 When the international community is confident
that there are minimum standards and a relevant enforcement
mechanism, it will increase the credibility of the program, and

160. SERVICES: COMMITMENTS: Schedules of commitments and lists of
Article
II
exemptions,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm
(last
visited October 3, 2012). For example, in the United States’ schedule of commitments, under the category “08. Health Related and Social Services,” market access is unbound except for the following conditions: “Establishment of
hospitals or other health care facilities, procurement of specific types of medical equipment, or provision of specific types of medical procedures may be
subject to needs-based quantitative limits,” as well as limitations on corporate ownership of hospitals in New York and Michigan. Id. In this sector, the
United States is unbound in national treatment except for the fact that “Federal or state government reimbursement of medical expenses is limited to
licensed, certified facilities in the United States or in a specific US state.” Id.
In this same sector the European Community is unbound in national treatment except for a limitation on market access of “the number of beds and use
of heavy medical equipment is limited on the basis of a health plan” and the
commitments are subject to a “needs test,” which is further defined in detail
in the schedule. Id.
161. Opting Out of Opting Out, supra note 5.
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dispel common misconceptions and horror stories that currently discourage donation.
The EUODD’s system of minimum standards may be a step
to initiate a conversation on organ exchange, but the EU’s proposed system falls short. The minimum standards aspect of the
instant proposal creates more overall equity between developing and developed nations by allowing developing countries
more flexibility to develop their own legitimate organ allocation
systems. The EUODD may de jure discriminate against developing countries or countries without a comprehensive organ
procurement and allocation system because it immediately imposes strict health and safety standards in an “all or nothing”
way and does not allow any time or flexibility for them to develop and adapt to meet the standards. Under the EUODD
proposal, there is a traceability requirement where in order to
have any organ exchange a country needs to know high levels
of information about the donor, the process and health and
safety information.162 This is a very hard standard to meet if a
country did not already have such a system in place. A more
widespread multilateral agreement to bind countries through
voluntary commitments and based on schedules reflecting
countries’ own situations will allow countries to develop their
infrastructure, allow the medical services sector to gradually
meet the minimum health standards, and provide opportunities for private health companies or other countries to invest in
the health sectors in developing countries. This suggestion
aligns with the enabling clause idea found in the GATT, which
gives a special exception to developing countries in order to allow them to develop.
It will also be essential for countries to commit themselves to
nationalizing transplantation lists within countries. A country
maintaining a unified allocation list not only makes logical
sense, but also is essential for the implementation of an international exchange. It is more beneficial to society if organs are
shared between nations, so it is important for countries that
have many transplantation centers to nationalize lists and not
utilize the same outdated geographic system that this plan attempts to replace. This is especially true at a domestic level,
where shorter geographic distances can easily allow for organs
to be shipped to different centers provided the organ and medi162. Directive, supra note 4, at 3.
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cal technologies are available. 163 Internationally, as in other
aspects of international relations, countries will need to interact with each other on a state-by-state basis in order to practically implement an international organ exchange.
F. Interaction with Domestic Laws and Transplant Policy
It is important to also examine how this proposal would interact with existing domestic law and transplant policy in participating countries. Most countries and the international medical community would agree that the convergence of health and
safety regulations is positive progress and not difficult to implement. Most developed countries operate their procurement
and allocation systems with medical health and safety standards that are up to date with current medical practice. Countries like the United States, EU member countries, and many
other developed nations all have legal standards regarding
health and safety based on scientific and medical information. 164 Adopting domestic regulations to adhere to these
standards would likely be a welcomed and relatively easy transition. Through the EUODD protocol that was implemented
August 27, 2012, EU members now have standardized health
and safety standards; 165 and expanding this to the international community is essential to the operation of the proposal. With
harmonized quality control and safety standards, countries can
share information about health and medical advancements
that will benefit organ procurement, transportation, and transplantation worldwide. Leading doctors and professionals in the
international medical community would generate the particulars of the minimum standards and all countries could elect to
adopt these standards. Minimum standards and a regulatory
framework would increase donation rates as transparency
would dispel common fears and misconceptions that often keep
people from donating.
Financial considerations, such as who will carry the monetary burden of the surgery and transportation will continue to
163. Segev, supra note 29, at 360.
164. Directive, supra note 4, at 3; see, e.g., Minimum Procurement Standards for an Organ Procurement Organization (OPO), ORGAN PROCUREMENT
AND
TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_2.pdf
(last revised Sept. 1, 2012)
165. Directive, supra note 4, at 3.
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be managed as they are currently. Under the proposal, the cost
of the exchange will continue to be borne by the patient and
their insurance company. While transplants are very expensive, it makes sense for the person who will benefit from the
live organ to pay for the procedure. Transporting organs internationally will drastically increase these costs to a level that
may be prohibitively high for certain patients, but this does not
subtract from the virtues of an exchange that will allow more
patients to be matched efficiently and accurately. Also, the
more countries that actively participate in the exchange with
minimal restrictions, the more that the incidental costs borne
by the donor country will eventually equalize.
The proposal would be compatible with most domestic procurement laws that exist in a majority of countries. It would
not force countries to change their organ procurement regimes,
which are based on their moral standards and preferences. An
opt-in country like the United States could continue with their
procurement preferences, and an opt-out country like Spain
could continue with their methods, and this proposal would not
force a certain ideal upon any given country.
Few countries use systems that would fundamentally conflict
with this proposal. Those conflicting systems are ones that either allow the sale of organs or have internal reciprocity arrangements. Iran is the only country that currently has an
open market for organs, and they would not be able to participate with this proposal because most countries around the
world ban the exchange of organs for valuable consideration.
Israel’s new organ procurement law—creating a hierarchy
within the country and a weighted list based on a person’s willingness to donate or their family members’ willingness to donate166—is one example of a system that would not be compatible with the protocol, and Israel would either need to change its
law or be excluded from the international organ exchange. A
country exchanging transplantation services internationally
cannot rank or give preference to citizens, because this almost
certainly will put foreign patients at the bottom of the list.
Practically, countries may still want to give a certain level of
preference to domestic candidates under certain circumstances,
but Israel’s law would never allow a foreigner to gain enough

166. Lavee, supra note 4, at 1131.
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preference on the list to receive a transplant.167 As noted earlier, Israel’s new law has come under scrutiny because of religious and ethical concerns, but would also have to be overhauled to include the real possibility of foreigners receiving
transplants and decreasing its overall protectionism.168
G. Challenges and Limits to Establishing an International Organ Exchange
A major consideration when analyzing the proposal’s vitality
is whether multilateral cooperation for organ allocation is practically feasible, regardless of the use of the GATS framework.
Commentators may doubt that cooperation is a realistic option
because nationalism is very powerful and countries are often
selfish with their scarce and coveted resources. As noted, human organs are not a resource that can be legally exchanged
for monetary consideration,169 raising legitimate questions regarding countries’ incentives to essentially surrender organs
and exchange them with the unfamiliar populations of other
nations. Countries may need practical motivations in order to
engage in international cooperation absent a formal reciprocity
contract. In addition, these motivations must appeal to local
constituencies because a lawmaker’s suggestion to send organs
abroad may prove to be politically unpopular when it is a wellknown fact that there is already a domestic shortage of organs.
Though these are valid concerns, there are very compelling
motivations for countries and governments to cooperate internationally in the context of organ allocation and transplantation. These considerations include increasing efficiency, reducing health care and transaction costs, creating a more productive workforce, responding to strong political pressures, and
increasing overall donation rates. In light of these practical
benefits, an international organ exchange under the GATS is a
realistic possibility for the future of organ procurement and allocation.
1. Increasing Efficiency and Decreasing Costs
First, consider organ allocation from an efficiency perspective. The traditional model of organ allocation prioritizes the
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Directive, supra note 4, at 1.

2013]

INTERNATIONAL ORGAN EXCHANGE

863

sickest patients first and restricts exchange to small geographic locales.170 This creates large inefficiencies that lead to “huge
disparities in waiting times—and hence deaths—across the
country as organs frequently do not go to the sickest patients.”171 An increase in the size of the potential population
“pool” for distribution will create fewer disparities and save
more lives, especially if patients can be matched faster with
donors around the world.172 Speed is essential to the success of
transplants.173 Additionally, because some organs are matched
based on biological similarity, the benefit of a wider genetic
pool of patients and donors would drastically increase the success rate of transplants.
The case of kidney transplants provides a helpful example in
this context. Kidneys are largely allocated based on genetic
compatibility. 174 Currently “the one-year organ-graft survival
rate for well-matched kidneys is 13% higher than that for poorly matched ones.” 175 If the donor pool expanded worldwide,
there would be more genetically suitable kidneys to match with
more patients, and the success rate of each transplant would
increase. Health care costs to support a patient with kidney
failure are extremely high and are most often paid for by governments.176 Dialysis is very costly because of frequent hospital
stays and necessary long-term care; in addition, most long-term
dialysis patients fund their treatment through government
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.177

170. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 300.
171. Charles Carlstrom & Christy Rollow, ORGAN TRANSPLANT
SHORTAGES: A Matter of Life and Death, USA TODAY, Nov. 1999, at 50.
172. Roth, supra note 63, at 52 (There may exist gains from exchange that
“come . . . from extending the possibility of exchange to all regions of the
country, and from the additional exchanges arising as a result of a thicker
market consisting of more available patient–donor pairs.”).
173. Id. (noting that “the two-year organ-graft survival rate for patients
who are in intensive care before their liver transplants is approximately 50%,
compared to 75% for transplantees who are still relatively healthy”).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Siegal & Bonnie, supra note 8 at 415.
177. Id. (“The costs attributed to organ shortage [were] substantial—
Medicare paid over $15.5 billion in 2002 for treating patients with end-stage
renal-disease, who predominate on organ waiting lists.”); Nadel, supra note 8,
at 293–295 (noting that every year “over 85,000 candidates remain on the
transplant waiting lists, . . . [the majority] waiting for kidneys, resulting in
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Governments, therefore, have a strong financial incentive to
broaden the pool and match people with kidneys that will be
the most genetically suitable. Matching patients with kidney
transplants sooner will eliminate significant costs because “it is
cheaper to have a transplant than to stay on dialysis for more
than two and half years, even among the sickest patients.”178
The savings are even greater for high risk patients, or patients
“with heart disease, diabetes or older age,” which will be increasingly more common with an aging baby boomer population.179 In a 1999 study, United States researchers found that
the medical system could save $27,000 per patient per year if
they were to get a kidney transplant instead of receiving dialysis treatment for that year.180 At the time there were 220,000
people on kidney dialysis in the United States; thus, if everyone receiving dialysis were able to receive a transplant, the
savings result for just one year would be $5.94 billion.181 Even
if just 20% of patients in one year were able to receive kidney
transplants instead of remaining on dialysis, the savings would
be almost $2 billion.182 Biological matching is the way of the
future in medicine and governments will feel pressure to use
these new methods to more efficiently and effectively match
patients, necessarily favoring an allocation system with a wider
geographic reach.183

increased use of dialysis, which is not only burdensome for patients, but also
costs taxpayers tens of millions of dollars per year”).
178. The “Break Even” Cost of Kidney Transplants Is Shrinking, UNIVERSITY
OF
MARYLAND
MEDICAL
CENTER,
http://www.umm.edu/news/releases/kidcost.htm (last updated Apr. 10, 2009).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.; The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8 (These costs
account for “$21 billion a year, more than 6% of Medicare’s total budget.”).
182. The “Break Even” Cost of Kidney Transplants is Shrinking, UNIVERSITY
MARYLAND’S
MEDICAL
CENTER
(May
1999),
OF
http://www.umm.edu/news/releases/kidcost.htm. These immense savings are
due to “shortening the length of hospital stay from an average of 10 to 7 days
after the transplant, and eliminating the use of expensive anti-rejection
drugs that were given intravenously in the hospital following the operation.
Better oral anti-reject medications are now available which patients can take
at home,” resulting in even further savings. Id.
183. Biotech Hurdles Facing Personalized Vaccines, Human Genome Project, HUMAN GENOME PROJ. (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.folderol.org/biotechhurdles-facing-personalized-vaccines.html (“Scientists are researching how to
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2. Decreasing Transaction Costs
Second, governments will want to cooperate internationally
in order to save on transaction costs and research and development expenses. When overhead costs can be spread over a
larger number of units, the unit price decreases.184 Countries
invest large amounts of money on their organ transplantations
and allocations systems, and increasing the scope of these programs will decrease costs for all parties. Nationalizing lists and
coordinating donor pools with other countries will avoid the
cost of maintaining separate functioning allocation schemes
and high administrative costs. Research and development is
also expensive, and encouraging international cooperation
through a new international forum will encourage intellectual
collaboration in order to find more effective ways to save lives.
3. Strong Political Pressure on Governments
Third, strong political pressure may compel governments to
cooperate internationally. Because government policy against
organ sale and transplant tourism prevents citizens from receiving the services they demand, citizens are likely to pressure
their elected officials to adopt a system of international organ
exchange.185 Under current allocation systems, unless a citizen
is willing to move or engage in dangerous and illegal transplant tourism, they are left without recourse. Transplant tourism is already a growing industry and governments must face
this fact.186 Because governments respond to constituent pressure, countries will be motivated to adopt a scheme of international cooperation as a means of legitimately allowing their citizens to engage in regulated transplant tourism. With large
amounts of people independently engaging in transplant tourism, it is neither effective nor good policy for governments to
simply outlaw an activity that their constituents demand. Citireplace one-size-for-all vaccines with personalized vaccines that are tailored
for the genetic make-up of the individual.”).
184. Industry
Matters,
Economies
of
Scale,
http://www.industrymasters.com/academy/economic-models/economies-ofscale.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
185. See, e.g., Lindy Royce-Bartlett, Kidney Donors Begin 1st Intercontinental
Organ
Exchange,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/01/us/intercontinental-organexchange/index.html (last updated June 1, 2012, 8:21 PM).
186. The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8.
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zens will therefore lobby their governments to move toward an
international organ exchange regime.
Governments also may receive political pressure because in
some respects geographic-based and country-based allocation
systems can be viewed as legally discriminatory. It is a medical
fact that “the quality of the biological match is usually better
when both the donor and recipient are of the same race.”187 Geographic limitations lead to small biological samples and a relatively homogeneous pool of donors and recipients. Thus, in
purposely restricting the pool by refusing to adopt an international system, a government is essentially discriminating
against minorities who have statistically less compatible
matches in the donor pool, and therefore a lower chance of receiving a lifesaving kidney. “To back away from a national system [or international system] or to minimize the importance of
biological matching on this basis alone would essentially be
placing a higher value on the lives of some patients than others, which would be discriminatory.”188 Governments, especially in countries that have had sensitive histories involving racial
discrimination will be highly motivated to broaden the genetic
pool of donors and recipients in order to combat any claim of
racial discrimination.
4. Potential Increase in Donation Rates
Finally, governments will be motivated to use the GATS as a
means of international cooperation because it may increase donation rates. Donations increase when a domestic allocation
system is perceived to be legitimate and may be hindered when
it is perceived to be discriminatory or not transparent.189 For
example, people can become skeptical of a country’s allocation
system when they hear rumors of wealthy or foreign citizens
being prioritized because of their status. Many people are discouraged from donating because of common misconceptions and
fears about their country’s organ allocation system. 190 Using
the GATS to allow countries to cooperate in a familiar context—through the WTO—will dispel many fears that inhibit
donation. The Spanish model highlights the importance of pub187.
188.
189.
190.

Carlstrom, supra note 171.
Id.
Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 302–03.
The gap between supply and demand, supra note 8.
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lic perceived legitimacy and how this can translate into increased donation rates.191 Governments would be highly motivated to cooperate internationally if more organs were available to its own citizens through higher donation rates because of
the system’s legitimacy and transparency.
H. Specific Limitations Relating to the Use of the GATS
While the GATS provides a useful framework for countries to
create an international organ exchange, there are some limitations associated with the GATS itself that may impede the effectiveness of the exchange. One main criticism of the GATS,
which also may apply in its relation to organ transplantation
services, is that countries have “the right to maintain public
services and the power to enforce health and safety standards.”192 If countries believe that their own regulation of public
health services preempts all international cooperation in the
area, then an international exchange could not function. The
GATS in this context, however, does not limit a country’s ability to manage their own health care systems because countries
can personalize their commitments under the exemptions and
schedules.193 Additionally, “the GATS allows countries to impose domestic regulations on services, if they do so in a nondiscriminatory way.”194
Another potential criticism may be that under the Article
XIV exception, a country does not have to abide by GATS rules
if they are attempting to protect “human, animal or plant life
or health.” 195 Although the language is broad, this exception
does not mean that countries are not allowed to create commitments related to health services. For example, countries do
have schedules of commitments on health and hospital services.196 The exception does allow a country to use Article XIV
to avoid liberalizing trade with respect to a certain area because they are attempting to protect health. However, under
191. Nadel & Nadel, supra note 8, at 302–03.
192. GATS: Fact and Fiction, supra note 55, at 2.
193. Belsky et al., supra note 112, at 140.
194. Id. at 141.
195. General Agreement on Trade in Services 294–95, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm
(follow “pdf format” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
196. See, e.g., Services Database, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://tsdb.wto.org/default.aspx.
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the framework of the GATS, “countries . . . have the option of
establishing limits on market access or national treatment
commitments . . . [and in fact, f]ew countries have made ‘full’
commitments in the health service sector—that is, commitments without any limitations.”197 Thus, because the GATS is
comprised of voluntary commitments, a country need not use
this exception if they wanted to limit trade, because they would
simply choose not to liberalize with respect to that area.
Countries may also attempt to use the GATS Article I(3) exception in order to avoid liberalization. The Article I(3) exception excludes “services supplied in the ‘exercise of governmental authority,’ defined as services supplied neither ‘on a commercial basis’ nor ‘in competition with one or more services
suppliers.’”198 A country may argue that organ transplants are
not offered on a commercial basis and that the regulation of
transplantation is an exercise of governmental authority.
Scholars and regulators have not explored this part of the
GATS in depth, but as discussed above, countries may have
strong practical and theoretical incentives to regulate organ
transplantation using the GATS. 199 Since participation in
GATS is voluntary, and countries can personalize their obligations, Article I(3) should not raise any additional issues.
Due to these exemptions and a country’s ability to choose
their own level of liberalization with respect to each sector,
there is a legitimate worry that these limits could undermine
the creation of the exchange itself. While exemptions do exist,
countries would ideally use these exemptions to personalize the
agreement for their country, and not to defeat the objectives
and purpose of creating an international exchange in this service sector.
Critics may be skeptical of the GATS’s actual ability to increase market access and liberalize. Scholars argue that there
has been “very little progress in terms of increased market access and elimination of discriminatory treatment.”200 Furthermore, scholars describe that “[a]s agreements start to take
shape, countries may still restrict the entry and practice of foreign providers and may limit foreign direct investment with

197.
198.
199.
200.

Belsky et al., supra note 112, at 140.
Id.
Id.
Mutchnick, supra note 114, at 46.
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discriminatory tax and regulatory policies. The GATS encourages these types of rules if they demonstrably protect the public’s health.” 201 If the GATS did not effectively liberalize the
market in the exchange for organ transplantation services, the
proposal would not have its desired effects. Although this is a
valid concern, countries will have incentives to use the GATS to
liberalize their trade policies with respect to procurement and
transplantation services, and not to perpetuate their protectionism, because of the strong public support of this unprecedented initiative.
CONCLUSION
The international community is beginning to entertain the
idea of drastic reform for organ exchanges. The correct step is
for countries to adopt a multilateral system of international
exchange in organ transplantation services and eliminate the
protectionist laws that limit organ supply and that disadvantage developing countries. If countries continue to look inwards for solutions, the black market will thrive and dangerous
organ trafficking and unregulated transplant tourism will become even more prominent. Countries also have strong practical incentives for adopting a system of international cooperation, and will receive domestic political pressure to make serious changes to their current allocation schemes if left unaltered.
Any solution must be compatible with communal and highly
valued moral ideals, particularly altruism. The GATS is attractive because it is a pre-existing treaty and the WTO serves as a
built-in enforcement mechanism; countries can use the WTO’s
dispute resolution forum if real disputes arise over the application of the treaty. Using the GATS to regulate and increase exchange between countries is not only a means to help needy
patients worldwide, but furthers the goals of altruistic donation
and increases the legitimacy of organ donation.
But what country will take the lead in these efforts? The EU
has taken steps to create a harmonized system, but this does
not go far enough because the EUODD does not emphasize a
true international organ exchange. The answer may be that
this is an opportunity for non-profits and NGOs to take the
lead in order to convince countries to cooperate and interna201. Id. at 7.
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tionally exchange transplantation services. Organizations such
as Eurotransplant and NHS Blood and Transplant are already
aiding the EU with its changes in its organ transplant policy.202
Potentially, other non-profits can provide support, data, and
expertise in the transition to an international exchange.
The GATS framework is capable of regulating organ procurement and transplantation and is a valuable tool for countries. A well-regulated international organ exchange would literally save lives and should be seriously considered by the international community.
Kiran Sheffrin

202. Eurotransplant, supra note 23; NHS Blood and Transplant, supra note
40.
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